February 2026.
By Foday M. Daboh
Public Policy Analyst | Political Economist
M.A. Public Policy | B.A. Political Science & International Relations
In Sierra Leone’s political evolution since independence, few offices have generated as much quiet disappointment as the Vice Presidency. Constitutionally, it is a powerful office—second only to the presidency. Politically, however, it has often been a cul-de-sac rather than a corridor to higher leadership. This contradiction invites a recurring national debate: Is the Vice Presidency in Sierra Leone a curse or a blessing? And why has no Vice President ever been elected President?
Today, history compels us to confront an even sharper question: has the pattern already sealed the fate of the current Vice President?
An Office Close to Power but Far from Succession
The Vice Presidency was never intended to be ornamental. The 1991 Constitution envisages it as a stabilizing institution—one that ensures continuity, coherence, and executive depth. Yet in practice, successive governments have treated the office less as a leadership incubator and more as a political balancing mechanism.
Vice Presidents have frequently been appointed to:
• Balance regional, religious or ethnic considerations
• Appease powerful party blocs
• Neutralize internal rivals
• Reward loyalty rather than cultivate ambition
This has ensured that most Vice Presidents enter office without a clear succession pathway, and in many cases, without an independent political base.
A History of Vice Presidents Without Presidential Destiny
Sierra Leone’s post-independence history offers sobering examples.
Under Siaka Stevens, Vice Presidents such as Sorie Ibrahim Koroma and later Francis Minah were powerful insiders but never groomed as successors. Minah’s dramatic fall—culminating in his execution after the alleged failed coup of 1987—illustrates the peril of proximity to power without political insulation. The Vice Presidency did not protect him; it exposed him.
During the Kabbah era, the case of Solomon Ekuma Berewa is particularly instructive. Berewa was perhaps the most prepared Vice President Sierra Leone has ever produced: seasoned, visible, deeply involved in governance, and central to the post-war reconstruction effort. Yet when he contested the presidency in 2007 as the SLPP candidate, he lost decisively to Ernest Bai Koroma.
Berewa’s defeat shattered the assumption that competence and continuity were enough. The electorate, weary of the status quo, opted for perceived change—even at the cost of experience. His loss remains the clearest empirical evidence that being Vice President can be a political liability rather than an advantage.
Under the APC, Victor Bockarie Foh briefly served as Vice President after the removal of Samuel Sam-Sumana. Foh’s tenure was short, politically constrained, and devoid of any succession ambition. Sam-Sumana himself offers another cautionary tale: elected Vice President, later estranged from the President, expelled from the party, and politically orphaned. His proximity to power did not translate into political security.
Across administrations, the lesson repeats itself: the Vice Presidency has never been a launchpad to the presidency in Sierra Leone.
Why Vice Presidents Fail to Become Presidents
The reasons are structural, not incidental.
First, Sierra Leone’s parties are overwhelmingly personality-driven. Presidents dominate party structures, patronage networks, and strategic decision-making. Vice Presidents are often deliberately prevented from developing parallel political machinery, lest they be seen as threats.
Second, Vice Presidents inherit the burdens of governance without commanding its levers. When fuel prices rise, inflation bites, or public services falter, Vice Presidents are blamed as insiders. Yet when policies succeed, credit flows upward to the President.
Third, the electorate often interprets Vice Presidential candidacies as continuity at moments when change is demanded. Even capable Vice Presidents struggle to persuade voters that they represent renewal rather than extension.
Timing and the Closing of the Political Window
Political ambition is governed by timing as much as talent. For a Vice President to successfully transition to the presidency, critical conditions must be established early: visibility, policy ownership, grassroots engagement, and a distinct political identity.
When these conditions are absent in the first half of an administration, recovery becomes increasingly difficult.
As administrations age, public fatigue grows. Economic pressures intensify. Internal party factions begin maneuvering. Succession debates harden. At this stage, the Vice President’s identity calcifies—not as a future leader, but as a custodian of the present.
It is at this juncture that one must confront an uncomfortable truth: it may already be too late for this Vice President. Not necessarily because of personal inadequacy, but because the structural and temporal constraints have converged against reinvention.
Loyalty Without Leverage: A Familiar Trap
One recurring theme in Sierra Leone’s Vice Presidential history is loyalty without leverage. Vice Presidents defend policies they did not design, justify decisions they did not control, and absorb public anger without commanding the tools of reform.
Party elites, especially as elections approach, are rarely sentimental. Their calculations are brutally pragmatic: who can win? Who can mobilize? Who can neutralize the opposition?
In those calculations, late-stage Vice Presidents are often deemed:
• Too closely associated with unresolved grievances
• Too dependent on presidential legacy
• Too politically underdeveloped to inspire a fresh coalition
Once this perception takes root, history suggests it is nearly impossible to reverse.
Is the Vice Presidency a Curse?
The Vice Presidency is not cursed by design. It becomes cursed by how power is managed.
When Vice Presidents are appointed for balance rather than leadership, constrained rather than empowered, and protected rather than prepared, the office becomes a political dead end. By the time parties begin talking about reforming the role, the damage is usually irreversible—for the individual involved.
What the SLPP Must Learn—Finally
For the Sierra Leone People’s Party, this history is not abstract. It is intimate and costly. The SLPP has produced some of the most consequential Vice Presidents in the country’s history—yet none has crossed the final electoral threshold.
The party must internalize four urgent lessons.
First, succession planning must be intentional from day one. Waiting until the twilight of governance guarantees failure.
Second, grooming a successor is not disloyalty. Parties that suppress internal strength weaken themselves externally.
Third, Vice Presidents must be allowed to build independent political capital. Shielding them from politics does not protect them—it erases them.
Fourth, institutions must outlive personalities. If every transition feels existential, it is because institutional pathways are weak.
If It Is Too Late, Let It At Least Be Instructive
If history has already foreclosed the current Vice President’s path to the presidency, then the lesson must not be denial but clarity. The greater tragedy would be to repeat the same mistake yet again—appointing future Vice Presidents without authority, visibility, or a credible pathway forward.
Sierra Leone has paid repeatedly for poor succession management: internal fragmentation, electoral defeat, and policy discontinuity.
History has already rendered its verdict on neglect. It does not work.
Conclusion: History Is Patient, Politics Is Not
The Vice Presidency in Sierra Leone is only a curse when parties refuse to learn. Unfortunately, learning late often produces the same outcome as not learning at all.
For this Vice President, the structural barriers, timing, and political realities may already be insurmountable. But for the SLPP, the choice remains stark and alive: institutional reform or historical repetition.
One prepares the future.
The other guarantees regret
