By Abdul Tejan-Cole
On April 11, 2019, after over 30 years in power, the Sudanese people rose up and overthrew the dictatorship of Omar al-Bashir. What subsequently replaced it was a political arrangement meant to lead the country to democracy in 3 years.
The political arrangement and constitutional declaration provided, among other things, for the creation of a Sovereignty Council comprising military and civilian members and a transition period of three years and three months. The military would lead the Sovereignty Council for the first 21 months and a civilian would do so for the following 18 months.
Based on this agreement, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, one of the soldiers in the Sovereignty Council, was appointed as chair and Abdalla Hamdok, the former Deputy Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), was appointed Prime Minister. The military’s reign as the head of the Sovereignty Council was due to end on November 17. However, many did not expect the military to hand over power to the civilians. As the date approached, the excuses increased. When all failed, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Sudanese army showed their true colours and seized power on October 25 —following in the footsteps of soldiers in Mali, Guinea and Chad.
The military dissolved the government, declared a state of emergency and detained Sudan’s civilian leaders, including Prime Minister Hamdock. He was later released on October 27 and put under house arrest. Some others arrested remain in detention. Several newsrooms were also raided and the internet was shut down. Braving live fire and tear gas, thousands of Sudanese took to the street of Khartoum and other cities waving Sudanese flags and chanting, “No to military rule!” At least 15 protesters have been killed since the coup and over 100 wounded. Long time Sudanese watcher Alex de Waal termed the coup as “Sudan’s aimless coup,” noting that “Al-Burhan is like a bankrupt tenant, facing eviction, who barricades himself seemingly oblivious to the landlord cutting off power and water.”
The military was simply bidding their time to stage a coup. They never wanted the transitional arrangement in the first place. Even though the IMF and other creditors have forgiven over US$ 50 billion, said to be about 90% of Sudan’s debt, the COVID-19 and other austerity measures introduced at the behest of the IMF have caused immense hardship for the ordinary Sudanese. This provided General al-Burhan and the military with an excuse for the coup. In addition, the military also stated that it had staged the coup to avoid a “civil war” and stop political infighting in the transitional government.
But these were mere pretexts proffered by the military. Their reasons were mainly egotistical. They did not want to lose political power and all that came with it. In addition, their economic interests were also at stake. An Aljazeera article in December 2020 stated that “(A)ccording to reports in Sudan, the army and security services control 250 companies in vital areas such as gold, rubber, meat exports, flour and sesame. They are exempt from paying tax and operate in total opacity, while the country is battling a deepening economic crisis.” This situation created tension between the military and civilian leadership. The Prime Minister expressed his disappointment that “only 18 percent of the state’s resources are in the hands of the government.” He pledged to make it a “priority” to return companies belonging to the security sector to the government. General al-Burhan and the military refused to transfer the companies to the government, saying he was only willing to have them pay tax. In addition, the Prime Minister had also complained the military budget was bloated and needed to be reduced. One of the first acts that Gen al-Burhan did after the coup was to dissolve the Committee for Removal of Empowerment and Recovery of Public Funds, which was set up to remove empowerment, fight corruption and recover the funds looted during the rule of the ousted president, Omar Al-Bashir.
In addition, the Sudanese soldiers are scared of accountability. Although they agreed to send former President Omar el-Bashir to the International Criminal Court, many soldiers in the current government are scared that Bashir may implicate them in The Hague and that if they lose power, they may also be held accountable for the many atrocities committed against civilians during Bashir’s reign and subsequent to it. Both al-Burhan and his deputy, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, aka Hemeti, have been implicated in, amongst others, the June 2019 massacre, which resulted in the deaths of about 40 people and hundreds were tortured, violated and raped in the streets of Khartoum.
The Sudanese coup has been roundly condemned. The African Union Peace and Security Council tweeted that it had decided “to suspend the participation of the Republic of Sudan in all AU activities until the effective restoration of the civilian-led Transitional Authority; Welcomes the release of the PM; Calls for the immediate release of the ministers & civilian officials in detention.” The US State Department condemned the coup, called for the immediate restoration of the civilian government and froze $700 million in direct assistance to Sudan, which was promised as part of a US plan to assist the country’s democratic transition. The European Union and the UN Secretary-General also condemned the coup.
However, General Al-Burhan is likely to turn to the Arab states for support. Although the Arab League has condemned the coup and Saudi Arabia has expressed its public opposition to it, many regard it as mere lip service. Many Arab nations are wary of democracy flourishing anywhere close to their borders. Apart from having similar first names, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan is said to have a close relationship with Egyptian leader Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. Sisi’s administration has received immense support from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The two are likely to support Sudan and strengthen their grip in the region at the expense of their rivals Qatar and Turkey. General al-Burhan’s deputy, Hemeti, also enjoys the patronage of both the UAE and Saudi Arabia. This is another opportunity for the Saudis and Emiratis to drive the Qatari and Turkish-supported Muslim Brotherhood further away from the region.
The Gulf Arab states’ battle for control of Sudan is an expansion of their ongoing geopolitical competition in the horn of Africa. Qatar and Turkey have significant influence in Somalia. Ethiopia has strong connections with Turkey. Qatar had troops in Djibouti and Eritrea border at some stage. The Saudis are now mediating between the two countries and have a military base in Djibouti. The horn of Africa plus Sudan and Egypt are part of the plans of Arab countries to control the Red Sea, one of the most heavily traveled waterways in the world, described as a ‘critical link in a network of global waterways stretching from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean to the Pacific—a strategic and economic thoroughfare.’ To add to the mix, a delegation from Israel, including Mossad agents, was in Khartoum to meet with the military. General al-Burhan has fully recognized Israel and is keen on building a solid relationship with them.
The Gulf Arab states are likely to be influential in determining how the current crisis is ended. If they fail to inject cash into the Sudanese economy and provide investment and diplomatic support to shore up the military, they will not withstand the internal protests and pressures from western countries. Al-Burhan has already started backtracking by suggesting that he wants Hamdok to serve as the next Prime Minister and form a new and independent cabinet to achieve the transition. He needs to be forced to honor the transition agreement and hand over to civilian leadership on November 17. The Sudanese people are yearning for democracy. They have had a taste of it. They like it and they want more of it.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the author’s employers.
